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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  effects  of  climate  policies  are  often  studied  under  perfect  competition  and  constant
marginal  extraction  costs.  In this  paper,  we allow  for  monopolistic  fossil  fuel  supply  and
more general  cost  functions,  which,  in  the  presence  of  perfectly  substitutable  renewables,
gives  rise  to limit-pricing  behavior.  Four  phases  of  supply  may  exist  in equilibrium:  sole
supply  of  fossil  fuels  below  the  limit  price,  sole  supply  of fossil  fuels  at  the limit  price,
simultaneous  supply  of  fossil  fuels  and  renewables  at the  limit  price,  and  sole  supply  of
renewables  at  the  limit  price.  The  consequences  of  climate  policies  for initial  extraction
depend  on  the  initial  phase:  in  case  of  sole  supply  of  fossil  fuels  at the  limit  price,  a  renew-
ables  subsidy  increases  initial  extraction,  whereas  a carbon  tax  leaves  initial  extraction
unaffected.  With  simultaneous  supply  at the  limit  price  or with  sole  supply  of  fossil  fuels
below  the  limit  price,  a renewables  subsidy  and  a carbon  tax  lower  initial  extraction.  Both
policy  instruments  decrease  cumulative  extraction.  If fossil  fuels  and  renewables  are  imper-
fect  but  good  substitutes,  the  monopolist  will exhibit  ‘limit-pricing  resembling’  behavior,
by  keeping  the effective  price  of fossil  close  to that  of  renewables  for considerable  time.
©  2019  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
It is well known from the Green Paradox literature (cf. Sinn, 2008, 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2015) that climate
olicies such as subsidies on renewables or rapidly increasing carbon taxes may  turn out to be counterproductive in a
ompetitive but otherwise second-best world. When fossil fuels are traded competitively, upon the introduction of these
limate policies owners of fossil fuel resources will supply more fossil fuel at the outset (Weak Green Paradox) and may
xtract faster over time so that also accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere is accelerated, and damages caused by
limate change are increased (Strong Green Paradox). Since the market for oil, an important type of fossil fuel, can hardly be
haracterized as competitive, the question arises whether this pessimistic outcome will also be obtained under alternative
arket structures. This is the issue we address in this paper.
In order to investigate the impact of policy instruments, we  first have to derive the equilibrium on the energy market.
n the seventies of the previous century the equilibrium has been characterized for several specific market structures. See
tiglitz and Dasgupta (1982) for a survey. We  restrict ourselves here to a monopolist that owns a non-renewable resource,
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and is facing a competitive fringe of suppliers of a renewable resource. Renewables can be produced at constant marginal
cost, which puts an upper limit on the price the monopolist can charge its customers. This gives rise to the possibility of
a limit-pricing strategy by the monopolist, which consists of setting the price equal to (or marginally below) the marginal
cost of producing the backstop.
Hoel (1978a,b) was the first to show that limit pricing may  prevail in equilibrium, in case of constant marginal extraction
costs. He also shows that with iso-elastic demand and zero extraction costs the existence of a perfect substitute implies that
the initial price set by the monopolist is higher than it would be without the substitute. Moreover, the lower the price of
the substitute, the lower initial extraction, at least if the initial price set by the monopolist is below the substitute’s price,
i.e., if there is no limit pricing from the start. The same case is treated by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1982, pp. 145–146). The
phenomenon of limit pricing was also found by Salant (1979), who considered extraction costs that are strictly convex in
the rate of extraction.
Gilbert and Goldman (1978) and Hoel (1983) show that any threat of entry encourages the monopolist to charge a higher
initial price than without the threat. More recently, Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016) have argued that, with constant
marginal extraction costs, limit pricing will occur throughout if demand for energy is inelastic. Finally, Wang and Zhao (2013,
2015) pay attention to a monopolist facing two competitive backstops. One, e.g., biofuel, has a capacity constraint in such a
way that it cannot meet by itself total demand at the backstop price. The other, e.g., solar, has no capacity constraint, but is
more expensive to produce. All marginal costs are constant. Wang and Zhao (2015) perform a comparative statics analysis
with regard to policy instruments, such as a subsidy on biofuel.
The objective of the present paper is threefold. Firstly, we consider the limit-pricing problem allowing simultaneously
for stock-dependent and convex extraction costs.1 Furthermore, we  allow both for elastic and inelastic energy demand. We
are able to show that there still is a final period of time with limit pricing and that part of this limit-pricing phase may
be characterized by simultaneous supply of fossil fuels and renewables. Moreover, we  identify the conditions under which
there is limit pricing throughout. Secondly, we relax the unrealistic assumption made in the previous literature of perfect
substitutability of fossil fuels and renewables (cf. Papageorgiou et al., 2017). We show that for large enough elasticities
of substitution the price path comes close to the path for perfect substitutability. Moreover, with imperfect substitution a
distinction needs to be made between the price elasticity of energy demand and that of fossil fuel demand. Actually, the
monopolist will always supply fossil fuel at a point of elastic demand for fossil. Hence, the issue of inelastic demand in reality
should be seen from a modified perspective. Thirdly, we  are particularly interested in the effect of policy measures such as a
carbon tax or a renewables subsidy. We  find that such effects crucially depend on whether or not there is limit pricing with
or without simultaneous use from the start.
Our analysis has some limitations. We  do not consider strategic interaction, such as a strategic game between a monop-
olistic supplier and a monopsonistic group of demanders (cf. Liski and Tahvonen, 2004; Kagan et al., 2015), or a differential
game between a resource monopolist and a producer of a backstop that becomes cheaper over time due to investments (cf.
Jaakkola, 2019). We  also do not study the more realistic setting in which part of the global resource stock is owned by a
competitive fringe. See Groot et al. (1992) for the case without and Benchekroun et al. (2019) for the case with a backstop
technology. Following Fischer and Salant (2017), we  furthermore abstract from dirty backstops (cf. Michielsen, 2014) and
interpret the backstop technology as being able to produce biofuels or to enable the electrification of transport in combina-
tion with technologies that generate clean electricity, such as wind and solar. Moreover, we do not allow for heterogeneity
of climate change policies across fossil fuel consuming countries. Hence, here we  do not address issues like spatial carbon
leakage under monopoly. This is considered in van der Meijden et al. (2018). Finally, we do not perform a welfare analysis
of policy interventions (cf. Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2015).
In the next section, we introduce the model, derive the main results and compare them to what others have found. We
give a full characterization of the optimum for the monopolist and perform a policy analysis. Section 3 extends the model
with imperfect substitutability. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
We  consider a two-country model.2 One country derives welfare from the use of energy. Energy comes from fossil fuel,
that is supplied by a monopolist located in the other country, or from a renewable resource that is supplied competitively.
Production of renewable energy has constant marginal costs. We  abstract from set up costs and capacity constraints in
renewables production. For the time being, we assume fossil fuel and renewables to be perfect substitutes. This assumption
will be relaxed in Section 3. The importing country’s government imposes a constant carbon tax on the domestic consumption
of fossil fuel. This can be justified by linear climate damages. We  also assume a constant unit subsidy on renewables—as
we often observe second-best climate policies such as subsidies on solar or wind energy in practice—and that the consumer
country’s government can commit itself to this constant subsidy from the beginning.
1 Hart (2016) argues that extraction costs of petroleum are increasing in cumulative extraction. Anderson et al. (2018) refer to Hyne (2012) to justify
their  assumption that the unit costs of drilling additional wells is increasing in the industry-wide drilling rate.
2 Our analysis does not necessarily require different jurisdictions. The two-country interpretation will be useful, however, in natural extensions such as
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.1. Energy demand and supply
The inverse demand function for fossil fuel is pc(q(t) + x(t)), where pc(t) denotes the consumer price of fossil fuel, and
(t) and x(t) denote demand for fossil and for renewable energy, respectively, at instant of time t. The producer price of
ossil fuel is denoted by p(t). The tax per unit of fossil fuel use is , the cost of producing energy from renewables is b, and
he subsidy per unit of the renewable resource is . In equilibrium, both supply of fossil fuel and of renewables is equal
o demand. Hence, we denote fossil fuel and renewables supply again by q(t) and x(t), respectively. Supply of and demand
or renewables is zero if the consumer price of fossil fuel pc(t) ≡ p(t) +  is below the consumer price of renewables, i.e., if
c(t) < b −  or p(t) < b −  −  ≡ b̂.  If the producer price p(t) equals b̂,  we get pc(t) = b − , implying that the consumer is
ndifferent between the two sources of energy. The monopolist sets the price as well as its own  supply, thereby leaving
esidual demand to the competitive suppliers of renewables. Energy demand at producer price b̂ is denoted by q̂. With S(t)
eing the fossil fuel stock at instant of time t, net instantaneous profits of the monopolist are
(q(t), x(t), S(t)) = p(q(t) + x(t), )q(t) − C(q(t), S(t)),
here C is the extraction cost function. We  assume Cq(q, S) ≥ 0, CS(q, S) ≤ 0, CSS(q, S) ≥ 0, CqS(q, S) ≤ 0, meaning that extraction
osts weakly increase in the extraction rate, weakly decrease in the stock size, and that for a given extraction rate the marginal
osts weakly increase if the remaining resource stock becomes smaller. The initial stock is denoted by S0. We  assume 
s well-defined, strictly concave in q and continuously differentiable for q ≥ q̂.  In addition, to have an interesting problem
e only consider initial stocks such that there exists a price not larger than b̂ and an extraction rate such that profits are
ositive.
It will be shown in the sequel that the equilibrium typically consists of three phases. Initially, from time 0 until time
1, the monopolist supplies at a consumer price below the net renewables price b − , so that p(t) +  < b −  (or p(t) < b̂);
hen, from T1 on the producer price is set equal to b̂,  whereas q(t) > 0 for some interval of time [T1, T3) with T3 > T1. The
imit-pricing phase consists of two sub-phases. One phase, from T1 until T2, where the extraction rate is equal to q̂ such that
he monopolist captures the entire market. And a final phase, from T2 until T3 where the monopolist allows renewables on
he market, implying simultaneous supply of fossil fuel and renewables at the limit price. Hence, in contrast to the case of
xtraction costs that are linear in the extraction rate, a limit-pricing strategy is not necessarily meant to keep renewables
roducers at bay. All phases can be degenerate, but the optimum always features at least one of the two  limit-pricing sub-
hases. We  use T3 generically as the final instant of time where there is fossil fuel supply. After T3 only renewables are
roduced and supplied.
.2. The monopolist’s problem
The monopolist needs to take into account that the price it sets should not exceed b̂, because otherwise all demand is
et by renewables. It should also take into account that total demand is to be met  by fossil fuel and renewables. Hence, the
onopolist’s problem is to find a path of extraction rates, supply of renewables and a final time of fossil fuel supply, T3, such





e−rt(p(q(t) + x(t), )q(t) − C(q(t), S(t)))dt, (1)
ubject to the resource constraint
Ṡ(t) = −q(t), S(t) ≥ 0, S(0) = S0, q(t) ≥ 0, (2a)
he condition that the producer price does not exceed the limit price
p(q(t) + x(t), ) ≤ b̂, (2b)
nd the nonnegativity of renewables supply
x(t) ≥ 0. (2c)
ere, r is the constant rate of interest. Note that we  can do as if the monopolist also decides on the supply of renewables.
rom here on we omit the time argument when there is no danger of confusion.
The Hamiltonian H and the Lagrangian L of the problem read
H(q, x, S, , t) = e−rt(p(q + x, )q − C(q, S)) + [−q],
L(q, x, S, , , t) = e−rt(p(q + x, )q − C(q, S)) + [−q] + [b̂− p(q + x, )] + x.
ccording to the Maximum Principle, the Lagrangian is maximized with respect to q and x, implying
e−rt(p′(q + x)q + p(q + x, ) − Cq(q, S)) =  + p′(q + x) if q > 0, (3a)
e−rtp′(q + x)q = p′(q + x) − , (3b)
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and, along the optimal path, the evolution of the shadow price satisfies
−̇ = −e−rtCS(q, S). (3c)
At T3, the time at which extraction stops, the transversality conditions read
H(q(T3), x(T3), S(T3), (T3), T3) = e−rT3 (p(q(T3) + x(T3), )q(T3) − C(q(T3), S(T3)))
−(T3)q(T3) = 0,
(4a)
(T3)S(T3) = 0. (4b)
Finally, the complementary slackness conditions are
[b̂− p(q + x, )] = 0,  ≥ 0, b̂ ≥ p(q + x, ), (5a)
x = 0,  ≥ 0, x ≥ 0. (5b)
We  first show that there is always a final interval of time with limit pricing, i.e., with p = b̂.  Actually there might be limit
pricing throughout. To give an example, let us define the consumer price elasticity of demand as
εc(q + x, ) ≡ −
(
d[p(q + x, ) + ]
dq
q
p(q + x, ) + 
)−1
,
and the producer price elasticity of demand as
εp(q + x, ) ≡ −
(
dp(q + x, )
dq
q
p(q + x, )
)−1
= εc(q + x, ) p(q + x, )
p(q + x, ) +  .




εp(q + x, )
)
p(q + x, ) − Cq(q, S)
]
=  + p′(q + x).
With inelastic demand (i.e., εc(q) < 1 and thus εp(q) < 1, for all q ≥ q̂) the term between brackets is negative and there is limit
pricing throughout, because  is necessarily strictly positive then. Intuitively, if demand is inelastic the profit maximizing
monopolist optimally chooses the highest possible price at any point in time. For the case of a non-renewable resource
monopoly with inelastic demand, this result was  derived by Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016). Proposition 1 describes
the outcome for the more general case we investigate here.
Proposition 1 (Limit pricing). There always exists a final limit-pricing phase.
Proof. We  will show that there exist T1 and T3 with T3 > T1 ≥ 0 such that p(t) = b̂ for all T3 ≥ t ≥ T1 and q(t) = 0 for all t > T3.
Suppose p(t) < b̂ for all t < T3. We  first show that p(T3) = b̂.  If p(T3) < b̂ then q(T3) > q̂ > 0 and x(T3) = 0. Hence, from (3a),
e−rT3 (p′(q(T3))q(T3) + p(q(T3), ) − Cq(q(T3), S(T3))) = (T3), (6a)
and from (4a)
e−rT3 (p(q(T3), ) − C(q(T3), S(T3))/q(T3)) = (T3). (6b)
But this violates the strict concavity of the instantaneous profit function in q.
The Hamiltonian evaluated at the optimum is continuous. Since the Hamiltonian equals zero at T3 it must approach zero
as t approaches T3. Suppose p(t) < b̂ for interval (T1, T3). We  have p(t) → b̂, q(t) → q̂ as t → T3 so that
(t) → e−rT3 (p′(q̂))q̂+ b̂ − Cq(q̂, S(T3))) as t → T3.
But from (4a)
e−rT3 (b̂ − C(q̂, S(T3))/q̂ = (T3). (7)
So that we have a contradiction with strict concavity in q again, implying that there must be a final interval with p = b̂.  
Hoel (1978a,b) shows the occurrence of limit pricing with constant marginal extraction cost. This result was also obtained
by Salant (1979) for cost functions that are linear or strictly convex in the rate of extraction, but stock-independent. Andrade
de Sá and Daubanes (2016) assume C(q, S) = c(S)q. Hence, the novelty of our finding lies in a generalization with respect to
the cost function.Intuitively, without a regime of limit pricing, marginal profits of the last resource unit sold just before depletion of the
stock at instant of time T3 would be smaller than the price of renewable energy, which is the price the monopolist could get
when selling this last unit directly after T3 instead. Therefore, the monopolist always prefers a final regime with the price
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Another general result is that a final phase with simultaneous use exists in case the cost function is strictly convex in
xtraction.3
roposition 2 (Simultaneous use). A final limit-pricing phase with simultaneous use of the resource and renewable energy
xists if and only if C(q, S) is strictly convex in q.






t follows from (3a) and (3b) that








=  ≥ 0. (8)
ut if the cost function is strictly convex in the extraction rate, this is ruled out. Therefore, q(T3) = 0, which by continuity
mplies that a final regime with simultaneous use exists, except at t = T3. Finally, if there is simultaneous supply the cost
unction cannot be linear in the extraction rate. 
Intuitively, if the monopolist would extract a strictly positive amount and sell it at the limit price just before depletion
t instant of time T3, profits could be increased by conserving a marginal unit and extract it at lower marginal costs directly
fter T3. In other words, due to the strictly convex extraction costs it becomes profitable to smooth out extraction over time.
ence, in the case at hand ‘limit pricing’ should no longer be interpreted as serving the goal of preventing the renewable
ubstitute from entering the market altogether.
The next proposition deals with the possibility of stranded assets.
roposition 3 (Stranded assets). If the condition b̂ − Cq(0,  S(T3)) = 0 has a solution with S(T3) > 0, this amount remains unex-
loited.
Proof
If S(T3) > 0 then (T3) = 0 from (4b). It follows from (4a) that
b̂q(T3) = C(q(T3), S(T3)).
ence, profits are zero and zero extraction is optimal, meaning zero extraction is as good as any positive rate of extraction,
mplying (T3) = 0. We  then have from the optimality conditions (3a) and (3b) that
b̂− Cq(0,  S(T3)) = 0.
iven our concavity assumptions, it also holds that if this equation has a positive solution with S(T3) > 0, this amount remains
nexploited. 
Intuitively, if marginal extraction costs reach the unit price of renewable energy once the remaining stock reaches the
hreshold value S(T3), the remaining reserves are too expensive to exploit profitably, implying that they will remain untapped.
Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016, appendix) allow for stock-dependent extraction costs that are linear in extraction.
hey examine, with their assumption of inelastic demand, the effect of climate policies and show that there still will be limit
ricing throughout. We  have more general extraction cost and demand functions and we  get more results for our specific
xample in Case 3 later in this section.
We  illustrate the outcomes for several cost specifications and provide additional insights by means of three special cases.
.2.1. Case 1: Linear stock-independent extraction costs
Suppose C(q, S) = kq with 0 ≤ k < b̂.  Hence extraction costs are linear in the extraction rate and stock-independent. This is
 special case of the model in van der Meijden et al. (2018). Along an optimal path the resource will be completely depleted.
oreover, along the final phase of limit pricing the extraction rate is q̂, because discounting induces the monopolist to
xtract as fast as possible, given that it is constrained by the price b̂. This, together with the constancy of the shadow price
, implies from (4a) that
 = e−rT3 (b̂− k).
3 Due to the presumed linearity of their cost function, Hoel (1978a,b) and Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016) do not get simultaneous use, contrary to
alant (1979) who  works with a cost function that is strictly convex in extraction.
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Now suppose that limit pricing starts at T1 > 0, so that there is an initial phase with the price below b̂. Then it follows from
(3a) with (T1) = 0 that
 = e−rT1 (p′(q̂)q̂+ b̂ − k).
Hence,
b̂− k
p′(q̂)q̂+ b̂ − k
=  erT3−rT1 . (9)
Provided that p′(q̂)q̂+ b̂ − k > 0, this yields the length of the limit-pricing phase. In order to determine the optimum, the
initial stock has to be taken into account. Let us define the critical stock Ŝ = (T3 − T1)q̂. If the initial stock is smaller than Ŝ
the equilibrium is one with limit pricing from the start. If the initial stock is larger than Ŝ  then there will be an initial phase
with the price below the limit price b̂.  However, if p′(q̂)q̂ + b̂ − k ≤ 0 (which holds, e.g., for inelastic demand) it is optimal to
have limit pricing from the start, irrespective of the initial stock size.
2.2.2. Case 2: Strictly convex stock-independent extraction costs
Next we consider the case of extraction costs that are still stock-independent, but strictly convex in the extraction rate:
C(q, S) = c(q) with cqq(q) > 0. We  assume that b̂ > cq(0). This is the case studied by Salant (1979). We  will show that the
optimum typically consists of three phases. Phase 1 runs from time zero until time T1 and has a price smaller than b̂. Then
follows an interval of time from T1 until T2 with limit pricing and the monopolist serving the entire market. Finally there is
a phase, from T2 until T3 with simultaneous supply of fossil and renewables at the limit price, where the extraction rate is
declining to zero over time. We  will show this by constructing the path and prove that it satisfies all the necessary conditions
and is therefore optimal in view of our concavity assumptions.
In the proposed optimum along (T2, T3) we have p(t) = b̂, q̇(t) < 0 and, hence, ẋ(t) > 0. Moreover, q(T2) = q̂ and q(T3) = 0.
Therefore (3a) and (3b) imply
 = e−rT3 (b̂ − cq(0)), (10a)
 = e−rT2 (b̂− cq(q̂)), (10b)
which gives the length of the final limit-pricing phase. We  can then determine total extraction along the interval by putting
T2 = 0. If the actual initial stock is smaller than this level, it is optimal to start with limit pricing, with a smaller initial extraction
rate than q̂. If the actual stock is larger, then there is room for a first limit-pricing phase along which q(t) = q̂.  The critical
initial resource stock for having an initial phase where the price is below the limit price is determined as follows. At T1 it
holds by continuity from (3a) that:
 = e−rT1 (p′(q̂)q̂ + b̂ − cq(q̂)). (10c)
Hence, provided that p′(q̂)q̂+ b̂− cq(q̂) > 0, the duration of the first limit-pricing phase is given by
erT2−rT1 = b̂  − cq(q̂)
p′(q̂)q̂+ b̂ − cq(q̂)
.
Since we already know how much is needed in the second limit-pricing phase we can now determine the critical stock
needed to have T1 > 0. If the actual stock is larger than this stock then indeed T1 > 0.
We further illustrate this case by considering an example with quadratic extraction costs and linear demand, C(q, S) =
c(q) = kq + 12 q2 and p(q + x, ) =  ̨ −  − ˇ(q + x, ), respectively. By using (10a)–(10c) we  obtain
e−rT3 (b̂ − k) = , (11a)
e−rT2 [b̂ − (k + q̂)] = , (11b)
e−rT1 [−ˇq̂+ b̂− (k + q̂)] = . (11c)
The duration of the two limit-pricing phases crucially depends on the convexity of the extraction cost function, which is
governed by  . Let us define  ̃ by b̂  − k −  ̃q̂− ˇq̂ = 0 and  ̂ by b̂  − k −  ̂q̂ = 0. Hence,  ̃ is the value of   for which the
marginal profit equals zero if the monopolist would serve the entire market at the limit price. It is clear from (11c) that T1 → 0
if   →  ̃, because the monopolist will perform a limit-pricing strategy throughout. Condition (11b) implies that T2 → 0 if
  →  ̂, meaning that the limit-pricing phase without renewables production vanishes: due to highly convex extraction costs
it is too expensive for the monopolist to serve the entire market at the limit price. Furthermore, note from (11a) and (11b)
that T3 → T2 if  → 0: the limit-pricing phase with simultaneous use vanishes if extraction costs become linear, as in Case
1.
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urves are the equilibrium time paths for  = 0.5,  = 2, and  = 3, respectively. Panel (b) shows the effect of the interest rate, r. The solid, dashed and dotted
urves  are the equilibrium time paths for r = 0.028, r = 0.005, and r = 0.075, respectively.
To illustrate the effect of convex extraction costs and the interest rate on the resource extraction path, and in particular
n the duration of the different phases of extraction, we  conduct a simulation analysis.4 We  choose the parameters of our
odel such that the benchmark equilibrium results in initial extraction of 32 billion barrels of oil and an initial oil price of
2 dollars per barrel, in line with the average crude oil consumption and crude oil price over the last decade (EIA, 2017)).
he benchmark parameter values are:  ̨ = 120,  ̌ = 1.2, b = 100, k = 18,   = 0.5,  =  = 0 (all in terms of US $ per barrel of oil),
 = 0.028, and S0 = 1650 (billion barrels of oil).
Fig. 1 shows the extraction time profile for different values of the extraction cost convexity parameter,  , (panel (a))
nd of the interest rate, r, (panel (b)). In all scenarios shown in the figure, the equilibrium starts with sole supply of fossil
uel at a price below the limit price, with extraction declining over time. Subsequently, there is a limit-pricing phase with
ole supply of fossil and constant extraction over time. The final phase is characterized by simultaneous supply of fossil and
enewables at the limit price, and declining extraction over time. In panel (a) the solid curve corresponds to the ‘weakly
onvex’ benchmark scenario with   = 0.5. The dashed and dotted curves represent the ‘medium convex’ and the ‘highly
onvex’ scenario with   = 2 and   = 3, respectively. The curves clearly show that the duration of the second limit-pricing
hase (featuring simultaneous use of the resource and renewables) increases with the convexity of extraction costs. In panel
b), the solid curve represents the benchmark scenario with r = 0.028. The dashed (dotted) curve corresponds to a scenario
ith a relatively low (high) interest rate of r = 0.005 (r = 0.075). The figure makes clear that the duration of the limit-pricing
hase with simultaneous use depends negatively on the interest rate, because smoothing out extraction over time (induced
y convex extraction costs) implies postponing revenues, which becomes more costly if the interest rate is high. Similarly,
n increase in the interest rate lowers the duration of the limit-pricing phase during which the monopolist serves the entire
arket. The reason is that postponing extraction from the beginning until the end of the limit-pricing phase is more costly
f the interest rate is higher.
.2.3. Case 3: Stock-dependent extraction costs
Finally, we consider the case of stock-dependent extraction costs. To give an example, let us generalize the quadratic
xtraction cost function to






s demonstrated in Proposition 2 whether or not some of the resource is left unexploited depends on the solution of the
ollowing equation:
Cq(0,  S) = kS = b̂. (13)
f k > 0, (13) has a positive solution for S, so that this amount is left unexploited. Clearly, if the actual initial stock is smaller
hen nothing will be exploited. If, however, k = 0 then nothing is left in the ground.Appendix A.2 shows how to find the initial stock such that it is optimal to start with an extraction rate q̂ and let extraction
ecrease over time, and the largest initial stock such that the equilibrium starts with limit pricing.
4 The derivation of the resource constraint that, together with (11a)–(11c), can be used to solve for the equilibrium is shown in Appendix A.1.
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2.3. Policy analysis
The existing literature on monopoly and limit pricing is scarce and mainly addresses the effect of changes in the renew-
ables price on limit pricing in special cases. Only a few papers pay attention to the effect of policy instruments under
monopolistic resource extraction: Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016) consider the case with inelastic fossil fuel demand
and van der Meijden et al. (2018) impose linear, stock-independent extraction costs. Policy analysis is relevant in view of the
Green Paradox. This branch of the literature (cf. Sinn, 2008, 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2015) is concerned with the
problem that climate policy instruments may  be counterproductive. For example, it could be that a subsidy on renewables
leads the owners of fossil fuel reserves to extract faster initially and deplete fossil fuels sooner, thereby aggravating the
climate problem. This result is obtained in many models with perfect competition on the energy market. Here we address
the question how the effectiveness of climate policies works out in the case of a monopoly.
In the Green Paradox literature a distinction is made between the Weak Green Paradox, which occurs if initial extraction
goes up, and the Strong Green Paradox, which is said to occur if total climate damages go up (cf. Gerlagh, 2011). For com-
pleteness we also study the effect of (exogenous) technological change that leads to a lower cost of producing the backstop
technology b. This is different from assuming a gradual decline in the backstop cost as examined by Fischer and Salant
(2017). We  will consider marginal changes in parameters. With non-marginal changes different results can be obtained. For
example, the subsidy on renewables can be set such that renewables become cheaper than fossil fuel.
The next proposition considers the effect of climate policies on initial extraction for the three possible cases in which
the optimum starts with (i) a limit-pricing phase featuring simultaneous supply of fossil and renewables, (ii) a limit-pricing
phase in which the monopolist serves the entire market, and (iii) the phase in which the resource price is strictly below the
price of renewables, respectively.5
Proposition 4 Climate policies and initial extraction
(i) Suppose the monopolist initially sets the limit price, but does not serve the entire market, i.e., q(0) < q̂, T1 = T2 = 0, T3 > 0. Then
(a) the initial extraction rate decreases if b marginally decreases or if  marginally increases.
(b) the initial extraction rate decreases if  marginally increases.
(ii) Suppose the monopolist initially sets the limit price and serves the entire market, i.e., q(0) = q̂,  T1 = 0, T2 > 0, T3 > 0. Then
(a) the initial extraction rate increases if b marginally decreases or if  marginally increases.
(b) the initial extraction rate is unaffected by a marginal change in .
(iii) Suppose the monopolist initially sets a price strictly below the unit cost of renewables (and thus initially serves the entire
market), i.e., q(0) > q̂,  T1 > 0, T2 > 0, T3 > 0. Then
(a) the initial extraction rate decreases if b marginally decreases or if  marginally increases.
(b) the initial extraction rate decreases if  marginally increases.






(S0, b, , ) ≡
∫ T3
0





since H(T3) = 0 in an optimum. In the case at hand we  have (0) = 0, because x(0) > 0 by assumption, so that
p′(q(0) + x(0))q(0) = p′(q(0) + x(0)).
Hence, we can write the Hamiltonian in shorthand as
H(0) = Cq(q(0), S0)q(0) − C(q(0), S0).
Due to the strict convexity of C in q, implied by the proposed equilibrium, H(0) is increasing in q(0). A decrease in b reduces
the profitability of the monopolist. Hence d
(S0, b, , )/db > 0, implying dH(0)/db > 0. Therefore, dq(0)/db > 0. The same
type of argument applies to changes in the tax rate.
Part (ii): q̂ is total energy demand at a consumer price is p(t) +  = b − . In the case at hand q(0) = q̂.  A decrease in b or an
increase in  stimulate demand. An increase in  leaves fossil fuel demand unaffected.
5 Part (ii) of Proposition 4 resembles results obtained by Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016), for the case of linear extraction costs and a price elasticity
of  demand below unity. We show that the result holds in any limit pricing phase, under more general assumptions.
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Fig. 2. Effect of climate policies. Notes: Panel (a) shows the case with an initial limit-pricing phase in which there is simultaneous supply of fossil fuel






























hich only fossil is supplied initially at a price strictly below the price of renewables. The dashed (dotted) line shows the effect of a carbon tax (renewables
ubsidy). Parameters are set at their benchmark values (see Section 2.2), except for the initial resource stock in panel (a), which is reduced to 30 in order
o  get T1 = T2 = 0.
Part (iii): As in part (i) we have

(S0, b, , ) ≡
∫ T3
0





e now have (0) = 0, because p(0) < b̂ by assumption. Now we use the concavity of the (entire) profit function to get the
esult. 
This proposition demonstrates that only in case of limit pricing with the monopolist supplying the entire market from
he beginning (part (ii)), we obtain a Weak Green Paradox upon a decrease in b − . In the two  other cases (part (i) and part
iii)), the opposite of the Weak Green Paradox occurs: a decrease in b −  lowers initial extraction.
In part (i), where the monopolist sets the limit price but does not supply the entire market, the reason for the reversal of
he Weak Green Paradox is that the climate policies lower marginal profits of the monopolist, who  responds by smoothing
ut extraction over time to lower extraction costs.
In part (iii), where the optimum starts with a phase during which the monopolist sets a price strictly below the price of
enewables, we also obtain a decrease in extraction upon more stringent climate policies. The intuition for the case of the
ecline in b or an increase in , which affect future profits of the monopolist, is as follows. Suppose that, upon a decrease
n b̂, the monopolist keeps the price path until the moment at which the price reaches the new, reduced, b̂ unchanged.
hen, cumulative extraction and discounted profits until this moment remain unchanged as well. However, discounted
rofits after this moment go down, due to the lower b̂.6 Therefore, the monopolist optimally responds by smoothing out
umulative extraction until this moment over a longer time horizon. This implies that the initial price rises and initial
xtraction falls. In so doing, the monopolist postpones the start of the era with reduced discounted profits.
Fig. 2 shows the effect of a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy in these latter two scenarios on the entire extraction
ath, for the quadratic extraction cost setting discussed in Case 2. Panel (a) shows the scenario in which the optimum starts
ith simultaneous supply of fossil fuel and renewables at the limit price. In panel (b), the monopolist initially sets a price
trictly lower than the per unit price of renewables.
The figure clearly shows that in both scenarios, extraction goes down upon the strengthening of climate policies. In
anel (a), both the carbon tax and the renewables subsidy increase the time at which the stock is depleted. In panel (b),
owever, a renewables subsidy speeds up, whereas a carbon tax slows down, depletion. Furthermore, panel (b) shows that
hen the optimum starts with an initial phase in which fossil fuel is cheaper than renewable energy, a renewables subsidy
ubstantially increases intermediate extraction, after the initial fall. The reason is that the limit-pricing phase in which the
onopolist serves the entire market starts earlier and is characterized by a higher extraction rate.
The next proposition examines the effect of climate policies on stranded assets.
roposition 5 (Climate policies and stranded assets). If b̂ − Cq(0,  S(T3)) = 0 has a solution with S(T3) > 0, a lower renewables
ost, a higher renewables subsidy or a higher tax all induce the monopolist to leave more fossil fuel untapped.
roof. If the condition b̂−  Cq(0,  S(T3)) = 0 has a solution with S(T3) > 0, part of the stock will remain untapped, by Propo-
ition 3. Since CqS < 0 we obtain an increase in S(T3) if b falls, if  increases, or if  increases. Hence, technological change and climate policies will lower the cumulative amount of carbon emissions, by inducing the
onopolist to leave a larger share of its reserves unexploited.
6 Technically, this would imply a downward jump in the Hamiltonian at the instant of time at which p(t) = b̂.
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ε  = 10, respectively. We have used  = 1.07,  = 0,  = 0, b = 1, k = 0, r = 0.05, and S0 = 76.5.
3. Imperfect substitution
Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016) argue that demand for energy is price inelastic and conclude for a model with linear
extraction costs that in the equilibrium only limit pricing occurs. Contrary to their assumption and our assumption thus far
(in line with most of the literature about the transition from fossil fuels to renewables), in reality fossil fuels and renewables
are not perfect substitutes. Papageorgiou et al. (2017) present evidence that the elasticity of substitution between clean and
dirty energy inputs significantly exceeds unity, but is far from infinitely large (around 2 for the electricity-generating sector
and close to 3 for the non-energy industries). This has major implications for the equilibrium. To illustrate the consequences
of imperfect substitutability, we consider an example in which utility (or, alternatively, production) from energy is given by
the following CES specification:
U(E) = E
1− 1 − 1
1 − 1
,









The elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and renewables is equal to ε. Assuming quasilinear utility and denoting
the composite energy price by pE, consumers maximize U(E) − pEE, implying that energy demand is given by
E = p−E , (15)
from which it can be seen that the (positively defined) price elasticity of energy demand equals  . The first-order conditions








≤ b − , (16b)
with equalities holding if q > 0 and x > 0, respectively. If there is positive demand for both energy sources, fossil fuel demand






ı + (1 − ı)
(
(p + )/ı
(b − )/(1 − ı)
)ε−1) −ε1−ε
. (17)





e−rt(p(q(t), ) − k)q(t)dt subject to Ṡ(t) = −q(t), S(t) ≥ 0, S(0) = S0, (18)
where p(q, ) is the inverse function of (17). The necessary conditions for the solution to the monopolist’s problem are
provided in Appendix A.3.
In order to show the effects of imperfect substitutability, we simulate the model for different values of the elasticity of
substitution between fossil fuels and renewables. Fig. 3 shows the time profile of the fossil fuel price in panel (a) and of fossil
fuel use in panel (b). The solid curves represent the case in which fossil fuels and renewables are perfect substitutes (i.e.,
G. van der Meijden and C. Withagen / Resource and Energy Economics 58 (2019) 101118 11
Fig. 4. Time profiles: the role of the energy demand elasticity. Notes: The solid and dashed lines correspond to the scenarios with  = 1.05 and  = 0.8,



































ε  =∞). We  have used  = 0,  = 0, b = 1, k = 0, r = 0.05, and S0 = 76.5.
 =∞). For the dashed curves, we have used ε = 30 and for the dotted curves ε = 10. The figure shows that the time profiles
f the price and use of fossil fuels converge to those under perfect substitutability if the elasticity of substitution between
ossil and renewables is increased. This illustrates the robustness of our earlier results in which we have assumed perfect
ubstitutability.
As noted by Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2016) and in Section 2.2 of this paper, if fossil and renewable energy are perfect
ubstitutes, and extraction costs are linear and stock-independent, there is a crucial role for the price elasticity of energy
emand. If demand is inelastic, the monopolist will optimally choose a strategy of limit pricing throughout, which effectively
mplies choosing the point on the demand curve where the price elasticity of demand for fossil is infinitely large. In case of
 constant elastic energy demand such as in (15) with  > 1, the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels is constant and
qual to the price elasticity of energy demand until the limit-pricing phase starts, when it jumps to infinity. With imperfect
ubstitutability, however, the elasticity (p) ≡ − (dq/dp)(p + )/q gradually changes over time. By using (17) we find
(p) = (p)
1 + (p) +
1





(b − )/(1 − ı)
)1−ε
. (19)
ence, the price elasticity of fossil demand can be written as a weighted average of the price elasticity of energy demand,  ,
nd the elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and renewables, ε. Moreover, if fossil and renewable energy are close
ubstitutes, which we assume to be the case, the relative weight of the elasticity of substitution increases over time as the
ossil price rises. To see this, note that by imposing a finite ε > 1, we  ensure that fossil fuels and renewables are good, but
mperfect substitutes. As a result, (p) tends to zero if p becomes infinitely large. Therefore, (19) implies that the elasticity
f fossil demand tends to ε.
Note that, irrespective of the price elasticity of energy demand (which may  well be chosen smaller than unity on empirical
rounds), the monopolist always chooses extraction such that the price elasticity of fossil demand exceeds one. As a result,
he difference between the case with inelastic and elastic energy demand is less sharp than it is under perfect substitutability.
ig. 4 shows that by moving from elastic demand (solid gray lines,  = 1.05) to inelastic energy demand (dashed gray lines,
 = 0.8) under perfect substitutability, the price and extraction paths in panel (a) and (b), respectively, change considerably,
ecause in the case with  = 0.8 there will be limit pricing throughout. Under imperfect substitution, however, the solid black
ines ( = 1.05) do not differ drastically from the dashed black lines ( = 0.8).
Hence, when allowing for imperfect substitution between fossil fuels and renewables, the empirical question whether
nergy demand is elastic or inelastic becomes less important than in the case of perfect substitution studied by Andrade
e Sá and Daubanes (2016). Still, the case with monopolistic supply differs considerably from the case with competitive
esource supply. If fossil fuels and renewables are close substitutes, i.e., if ε is large, (p) will rapidly change with p if the
elative effective price of these energy sources, z ≡ [ı/(1 − ı)](p + )/(b − ), is close to unity. This gives rise to ‘limit-pricing
esembling’ behavior by the monopolistic fossil fuel supplier: if z comes close to unity, marginal profits will rapidly rise with
ncreases in p. Therefore, once z comes close to unity, it is profitable for the supplier to keep it close to unity until most of
he stock is exhausted. Afterwards, the price will increase, fossil demand will tend to zero, the elasticity of fossil demand
ill rapidly increase and marginal profits will converge to average profits, as in the extreme case of perfect substitutability.
Fig. 5 illustrates the development of the price elasticity of fossil demand over time in panel (a) and its dependence on the
ffective relative price z in panel (b), for two different values of the elasticity of substitution between fossil and renewable
nergy. The dashed line corresponds with ε = 30 and the dotted line with ε = 10. In both cases, the price elasticity of fossil
emand starts out just above one (indicated by the flat dotted line in panel (a)) and tends towards ε in the long run.
12 G. van der Meijden and C. Withagen / Resource and Energy Economics 58 (2019) 101118Fig. 5. Price elasticity of fossil demand. Notes: The dashed and dotted line correspond to the scenarios with ε = 30, and ε = 10, respectively. We have used
  = 1.07,  = 0,  = 0, b = 1, k = 0, r = 0.05, and S0 = 76.5.
4. Conclusion
In a general model of non-renewable resource supply by a monopolist (allowing for stock-dependent extraction costs that
are convex in the extraction rate) we have shown that, if fossil fuels and renewables are perfect substitutes, the equilibrium
necessarily contains a limit-pricing phase. Moreover, if extraction costs are strictly convex in the extraction rate, at least
part of this limit-pricing phase is characterized by simultaneous supply of the non-renewable resource and the renewable
substitute. Hence, a strategy of limit pricing is not necessarily meant to keep producers of renewable energy at bay.
It has been shown that the effects of environmental policies, such as a carbon tax or a renewables subsidy, can be the
opposite of what they would be in the case of perfect competition. In particular, the initial use of fossil fuels can decrease
instead of increase as a consequence of more stringent climate policies. This is not to say that such policies are less harmful
from a social welfare perspective than in the case of perfect competition: whether or not this is the case depends on the
acuteness of climate change damages.
We  have demonstrated that our results are robust to introducing imperfect but good substitutability between fossil and
renewable resources: the monopolist will choose a ‘limit-pricing resembling’ strategy by keeping the effective fossil price
just below the effective renewables price for a considerable period of time. Nevertheless, abrupt regime shifts from ‘Hotelling
pricing’ to ‘limit pricing’ disappear and the empirical question whether energy demand is elastic or inelastic has less drastic
implications for the fossil price and extraction paths than under perfect substitutability.
In future research, a strategic game in which the fossil importing country sets a renewables subsidy and the fossil fuel
exporter sets its price—both conditional on the remaining stock—could be introduced. Another promising way  to proceed
is by generalizing the analysis to the case of oligopolistic fossil supply. This is an interesting field of research because of the
possibility of strategic interaction among supplying firms, which is absent in the cases of monopoly and perfect competition.
Appendix A.
A.1 Resource constraint
In this Appendix, we  derive the resource constraint that, together with (11a)–(11c) completes the description of the
equilibrium in Case II of Section 2.2. By imposing  = 0 in (3a) we get
e−rt[−ˇq(t) + b̂ − (k + q(t))] = , if 0 ≤ t ≤ T1. (A.1a)
Furthermore, by using  = 0 in (3a) and (3b) we obtain
e−rt[b̂ − (k + q(t))] = , if T2 ≤ t ≤ T3. (A.1b)
During the first limit-pricing phase from T1 until T2, when the monopolist serves the whole market, we  have q(t) = q̂.  Using




b̂− k − ert
 
dt = b̂−  k
r 
[r(T3 − T2) − 1 + e−r(T3−T2)] , (A.2a)S̃0 = Ŝ0 +
∫ T2
T1
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f S0 < Ŝ0 we have T1 = T2 = 0 and the monopolist sets p = b̂ from the beginning, but does not serve the entire market. If
ˆ0 < S0 < S̃0 we get T1 = 0 and the monopolist also starts with limit pricing (i.e., p = b̂)  and initially serves the entire market.
f S0 > S̃0 the initial producer price is below b̂ and, by using (A.1a), the resource constraint requires
S0 = S̃0 +
∫ T1
0
 ̨ −  − k − ert
2  ̌ + dt = S̃0 +
 ̨ −  − k
2  ̌ + +
b̂− k
2  ̌ + (e
rT3 − e−r(T3−T1)) . (A.3)
ence, if S0 > S̃0, the resource constraint and (11a)–(11c) can be used to solve for T1, T2, T3, and , which fully describes the
quilibrium.
.2 Critical stock levels with stock-dependent extraction costs
In this Appendix, we show how to find the initial stock such that it is optimal to start with an extraction rate q̂ and let
xtraction decrease over time, and the largest initial stock such that the equilibrium starts with limit pricing if extraction
osts are given by (12).
Assume that (13) is satisfied. We  will first determine the initial stock such that it is optimal to start with an extraction
ate q̂ and let extraction decrease over time. So, T2 = 0. This is a bit more complicated than in Case 2 (where extraction costs
ere stock-independent) because the shadow price is no longer a constant. From the optimality conditions (3a)–(3c), with
(t) > 0, we have
e−rT2 (b̂ − Cq(q̂, S(T2))) = (T2), (A.4a)
b̂− Cq(0,  S(T3)) = (T3) = 0, (A.4b)
e−rt(b̂− Cq(q(t), S(t)) = (t), T2 < t < T3, (A.4c)
̇(t) = e−rtCS(q(t), S(t)), T2 < t < T3, (A.4d)
Ṡ(t) = −q(t), T2 < t < T3. (A.4e)
his yields a second-order differential equation in S. Under the conditions that we  have imposed on the extraction cost
unction, there exists a unique initial S that satisfies the boundary conditions, which we denote by S(T2). Hence, if the initial
esource stock equals S(T2) it is optimal to start with q(T2) = q̂,  to have limit pricing, but allowing for a gradually increasing
arket share of renewables, to leave part of the resource stock in the ground and to let extraction go to zero. For a smaller
tock there will still be limit pricing from the start, but initial extraction will be below q̂. If the initial stock is smaller than the
olution to (13) no extraction will take place at all. For a larger initial stock, there will be an initial phase with limit pricing,
here the monopoly serves the entire market.
Finally, we derive the critical stock S(T1) for which this optimum prevails, meaning that for a higher stock than S(T1), the
nitial price is below the limit price. To find the threshold we have to consider the following system of equations:
e−rT1 (p′(q̂)q̂+ b̂− Cq(q̂, S(T1))) = (T1), (A.5a)
̇(t) = e−rtCS(q̂, S(t)), T1 < t < T2, (A.5b)
Ṡ(t) = −q̂, T1 < t < T2. (A.5c)
ondition (A.5a) says that with an initial stock larger than S(T1) there will be no limit pricing at T1. Note that for a given S(T1)
e know (T1) (since we can put T1 = 0). We  know S(T2) from (A.4a)–(A.4e). Under the conditions that we  have imposed on
he extraction cost function, there exists a unique initial (T2)erT2 that satisfies (A.5a)–(A.5c) for the given S(T1) and S(T2).
o, we need to find the S(T1) that yields the (T2)erT2 obtained from (A.4a).
.3 Imperfect substitution
The Hamiltonian H associated with the profit maximization problem of the monopolist reads
H(q, , t) = e−rt(p(q, ) − k)q + [−q],




p(q, ) + p′(q)q − k
)
= (t). (A.6)
long the optimal path, the evolution of the shadow price satisfies
˙−(t) = 0. (A.7)
urthermore, the transversality condition is given by
lim
t → ∞(t)S(t) = 0. (A.8)
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